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The new tax law increases tax rates for high income individuals, and expands the earned
income tax credit for low income individuals. We use a sample of actual tax returns to compute
estimates of the "marriage tax" -thechange in couples joint tax upon marriage -underthis new
law. We predict that in 1994 52percentof American couples will pay a marriage tax, with an
average of about $1,244; 38 percent will receive a subsidy averaging about $1,399. These
aggregate figures mask a considerable amount of dispersion in the population. Under the new
law, the marriage tax for certain low-income families can exceed $3,000 annually; for certain
very high income families it can exceed $10,000 annually.
Daniel R. Feenberg Harvey S. Rosen
National Bureau of Economic Research Department of Economics
1050 Massachusetts Avenue Princeton University
Cambridge, MA 02138 Princeton, NJ 08544
and NBERWe shouldn't disparage
Marriage.
But the IRS makes it expensive.
Getting married ought to relax you,
But it also increases the amount they tax you,
Which makes many young pairs apprehensive.
The Bible says that marriage is better than burning,
And fruitlessyearning Isn't a funanswerto this moral quandary.
So a lot of people prefer to live in
Sin
Because marriage, though desirable, has become a
financialsquandery.——RobertN. Feinstei&
1.Introduction
PresidentClinton's changes in the personal income tax,
embodied in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (05RA93),
willaffect the tax liabilities of many Americans. The changes at
the two extremes of the income distribution are particularly
important. At the high end, marginal tax rates have been increased
substantially. At the low end, there has been a major expansion of
the earned income tax credit. The impacts of these changes on
economic behavior and tax revenues have already been the subject of
considerable attention. (See, for example, Feldstein and Feenberg
(1993) and Browning (1993].) One issue that has received
relatively little analysis is the impact of the new law on the tax
consequences of marriage.There has been some press attention
given to the fact that the new law may lead to increased income tax
liabilities for couples when they marry. The Wall Street Journal,
for example, discussed the case of a California couple who "put off
taking their wedding vows" because "marriage would cost us $7,000
or $8,000 a year."2 However, there has not been any systematic
discussion of how the law is actually likely to change the so-called marriage taxes (and subsidies) for various groups in the
population. In this paper we explain and document the changes in
the marriage tax associated with the new tax law.
Section 2 explains more carefully what the marriage tax is,
and how OBRA93 affects it for various kinds of couples. In Section
3, we use data from a sample of actual tax returns to compute
estimates of the marriage tax by income class for the year 1994.
We predict that 52 percent of American couples will pay an annual
average marriage tax of about $1,244, and 38 percent will receive
an average subsidy of about $1,399. Relative to the old law, there
is not much of a change in the aggregate marriage tax. But the
aggregate figures mask important differences for certain income
groups.Specifically, some low—income families will face much
higher marriage taxes than before. In this way, they are similar
to their counterparts at the opposite end of the income scale, for
some of whom the tax on being married will increase by thousands of
dollars. Section 4 concludes with a summary and a discussion of
some implications of the findings.
2. Backaround
The history of the marriage tax has been discussed carefully
in a number of articles; see, for example, Brozovsky and Cataldo
(1994] and Rosen (1987]. The basic source of the marriage tax is
the fact that key elements of the tax law depend on an individual's
family situation, including the rate schedule, the standard
deduction, and the earned income tax credit. Hence, the act of
getting married per se affects individuals' tax liabilities, even
if their work and saving decisions stay the same.As we show3
below, tax liabilities do not always increase; under some
circumstances, the tax system subsidizes marriage.
We now discuss the provisions of OBRA93 that are most relevant
to the calculation of marriage taxes and subsidies, and then
provide some illustrations of their significance.
2.1 Rate Schedules
Like the previous law, OBRA93 has different rate schedules
depending on the taxpayer's marital status. The top of Table 1
shows for 1994 the correspondence between marginal tax rates and
taxable income for married couples filing joint returns (the
husband and wife file together), married couples filing separate
returns, single individuals, and heads of households (unmarried
individuals who maintain a household that includes as a member a
son, daughter, or any other person eligible to be claimed as a
dependent.) Note that the breakpoints for the first two brackets
on the separate return are exactly half those of their counterparts
on the joint return. This means that in these brackets, a couple
could at best come out even by filing separate returns. For all
the filing statuses, the high end brackets are much higher than
they were before 1993. Specifically, the higher bracket rate used
to be 31 percent; now the maximum statutory marginal tax rate is
39.6 percent.3
The schedules in Table 1 suggest that, just as under previous
law, .it is possible for marriage to lower a couple's joint tax
liability.If X has a taxable income of $30,000 and I has no
income, then if they marry, all of X'staxableincome is subject to4
a 15 percent rate, while before marriage, some would also be taxed
at a 28 percent rate.But the possibility of tax liabilities
increasing with marriage is also present. If A and B each have
taxable incomes of $20,000 and file as singles, then their taxable
income is taxed at a rate of 15 percent. But if they marry, then
part of their income is taxed at a 28 percent rate. Hence, their
joint tax liability increases with marriage.
These comparisons are somewhat misleading because they fail to
take into account that couples and singles with the same Adjusted
Gross Income (AGI) have different taxable incomes due to
differences in the standard deductions they are allowed to take.
(These differences are documented in the bottom panel of the
table.) The calculations done below incorporate this information,
and the qualitative result that emerges is similar—-spouses with
roughly equal incomes tend to pay a marriage tax, while spouses
with unequal incomes tend to receive a marriage subsidy.
2.2 Earned Income Tax Credit
The provisions of the earned income tax credit (EITC) are
noted in the middle of the Table 1. The credit is a percentage of
household earnings that depends on the number of children in the
family. It ranges from 7.65 percent if there are no children to
30.0 percent if there are two or more. The credit is applied to
each dollar of earnings in a phase—in range, reaching a maximum at
the end of this range. Then it is implicitly taxed away over a
phase—out range. According to the table, for example, a family
with two or more children receives a credit of $2,528 if its5
earnings are between $8,525 and $11,000.The $2,528 is then
phased—out over the range from $11,000 to $25,299, so that for each
dollar of earnings over $11,000, the credit is reduced by 17.68
cents. Importantly, if the individual's tax liability is less than
the EITC, the difference is refunded.4
The key point in the marriage tax context is that on a joint
return, eligibility for the EITC is based on the couple's joint
earnings. Hence, an unmarried individual with a child may lose part
or all of the credit upon marriage. As we shall see, this can
impose a relatively high burden when both spouses have low earnings
but the sum of their earnings exceeds the threshold of the relevant
phase—out range.
2.3 Standard Deduction
The standard deduction allowed on each type of return is
recorded in the bottom of Table 1.Note that the standard
deduction associated with two single returns Is $7,600 (2x
$3,800); this exceeds the standard deduction on a joint return by
$1,250. This difference tends to create a penalty for marrying,
ceteris Daribus. The penalty is even more severe when two heads of
households marry; in this case, the loss of deductions amounts to
$4,850 (— 2x $5,600 —$6,350).
2.4 Some Illustrations
This section illustrates how the provisions in Table 1
determine the tax consequences of marriage. These illustrations
assume that all income is from earnings and every return uses the
standard deduction. The only other subtraction from AGI to obtain6
taxable income is the personal exemption of $2450 times the number
of people on the return. (The exemption is constant regardless of
filing status, although it is phased out for high income
individuals; see Young (1993).) The calculations also assume that
if 2-children couples split, each child is claimed as an exemption
on one tax return.For the sake of comparison, we also compute
what the marriage tax would have been under the old law.5
The results are reported in Table 2, which shows marriage
taxes and subsidies for couples with various incomes under the old
and new laws. Results for childless couples and couples with two
children are reported separately. Negative numbers indicate that
tax liabilities go down with marriage.Thus, for example, if
spouse I has an income of $10,000 and spouse II has zero income,
then if the couple is childless, under the new law the couple
receives an annual marriage subsidy of $562. However, when both
spouses earn $10,000, the couple's joint tax liability increases by
$188 with marriage, again assuming that there are no children.
Taken together, the figures suggest the following
observations:
a. Exceot at the high-end of the income distribution. most
childless couoles face little chanae in the marriage tax. Although
the new law does introduce for the first time an EITC for childless
individuals, it is phased—out at such a low income level that most
of our hypothetical couples are not affected.
b. For many low—income couoles with children, the marriaae
tax is higher under the new law.Indeed, for families at the7
bottom end of the income distribution, the marriage taxes for two-
earner families are so high that it is worthwhile to do one of the
calculations in detail.Consider a two—earner family with two
children.If each spouse makes $10,000 and they file a joint
return, their AGI is $20,000. Subtracting the standard deduction
of $6,350 and their exemptions of $9,800 (—4x $2,450) gives a
taxable income of $3,850 and a pre—EITC tax liability of $577.50 (
.15x $3,850). The EITC for this family is $937, leading to a net
tax liability of —$359 ——thefamily gets a refund of $359.
Now asáuine that the spouses divorce, that spouse I takes one
child and files as a head of household, and that spouse II does the
same. Spouse I's tax calculation is as follows: AGI of $10,000
minus personal exemptions of $4,900 (—2x $2,450) and a standard
deduction of $5,600 gives a taxable income of zero, and a pre—
credit tax liability of zero, Subtracting an EITC of $2,038 leads
to a tax refund of $2,038. For spouse II, the situation is the
same. The sum of their tax liabilities is —4,076 (—$2038x 2).
Comparing this to the -$359 figure if they file jointly, we get a
difference of $3717, the figure in the table.6
The large marriage tax occurs partly because the standard
deduction on a joint return is $4,850 less than the sum of the
deductions on two head of household returns.In addition, the
inclusion of both spouse's incomes on the joint return reduces the
total EITC. As the table makes clear, the previous law was also
quite"anti—family"for low—income workers with children. But by
increasing the importance of the EITC, the Clinton law makes it8
more so.
c. The tax law i,rovides a substantial "dowry" for an
individual with no income who marries someone with income.
Suppose, for example, that W, who has an AGI of $50,000, is living
with V, who has no income. They have no children. According to
the table, if they marry, W's tax liability decreases by about
$3,382. One spouse having zero income is not a necessary condition
for a dowry, however.The figures indicate that marriage is
subsidized as long as the spouses' incomes are sufficiently far
apart.
d.Conversely. the tax law oenalizes marriaae for couDles
whose incomes are relatively close.Suppose C and H both have
$25,000 incomes. According to the table, if they are childless and
marry, their joint tax burden increases by $286.This effect
becomes quite extraordinary for high income couples. If one spouse
has $300,000 and the other has $150,000, their joint tax liability
increases by over $12,000 if they marry. The comparable figure
under previous law was only $2,554; the huge increase is a
consequence of the fact that high—end marginal tax rates have been
increased so much by the new law.7
Taken together, the results in Table 2 suggest that OBRA 93,
like its predecessor, is far from marriage neutral. Some couples
will experience substantial tax increases upon marriage, others
substantial tax reductions. The discussion surrounding the table
also indicates that the marriage tax faced by a couple depends
crucially on the incomes of each of its members and on their number9
of dependents, inter p11g. Hence, in order to say anything about
the actual magnitude of the marriage tax, we require estimates of
the joint distribution of these variables in the population. A
data set with such estimates is analyzed in the next section.
3. Simulation Results
In this section we use information from a sample of actual
rj.s. tax returns to calculate marriage taxes under OBRA93, and
compare their magnitudes to those under the old law. The figures
are generated by the Tax Simulation Model (TAXSIM) maintained by
the National Bureau of Economic Research.5 TAXSIM contains a
stratified random sample of 96,589 tax returns filed in 1989. To
obtain estimates for years subsequent to 1989, the data are "aged"—
—raised in proportion to the growth of population and income as
measured in the national income and product accounts. The
adjustments used to make projections from 1989 to 1994 assume 18
percent nominal per capita income growth, a rate that is consistent
with Congressional Budget Office predictions of income tax
revenues. Unlike the simple examples of the previous section, the
tax computation allows for different tax rates on different sources
of income, itemized deductions, etc. Sample weights are applied to
the results on each return to obtain totals for the population as
a whole.
The sample used in this study consists of all joint returns.
Tax liabilities on these joint returns are calculated under both
the previous law (as it would have looked in 1994) and OBRA93.
Then, the joint tax liability of each couple is computed under the10
assumption that a divorce occurs.Tax returns do not contain
information on the division of family earnings between husbands and
wives. This was imputed using data from the March 1990 Current
Population Survey (CPS). For each tax return, we identified cPs
records that were similar with respect to family income and number
of dependents. We then allocated income on the tax return in
proportion to CPS earnings.
After divorce, any itemized deductions on the return are
allocated to the spouse with higher income. Members of childless
couples are assumed to file as singles. For couples with children,
we allocate all but one exemption to the higher—income spouse. If
there is only one child, he or she is claimed by the higher-income
spouse. Spouses who end up not claiming a child file as singles;
otherwise they file as heads of households.This algorithm
approximates a strategy of joint tax minimization. (It is
computationally difficult to minimize joint tax liability exactly
because deductions on certain items can be taken only when they
exceed some threshold percentage of AGI.)Of course, one can
imagine other reasonable algorithms for allocating exemptions and
deductions between the spouses.We experimented with several
others, such as allocating itemized deductions in proportion to
income, and found that the qualitative results were not materially
affected.
Column (1) in Table 3 shows the average marriage tax under
OBRA93 by AGI class.9 The figures in square brackets show the
comparable figures for the old law, The average tax is greatest11
for the highest income group ($7,451), but there is no general
tendency for the tax to increase with income. The average marriage
tax for the population as a whole is $124. Under the old law, in
contrast, on average there was a subsidy to marriage of $143.
Hence, on average, the law has gone from being slightly pro—
marriage to slightly anti-marriage. The most striking differences
between the old and new laws arise for the higher income group,
where the average tax is $7,451, while under the old law it was a
subsidy of $3,667. This difference can be attributed to the 10
percent income tax surcharge on taxable incomes in excess of
$250,000 without distinction of marital status.
Of course, the averages in column (1) are over both positive
and negative values of the marriage tax. As stressed in the last
section, couples with about the same AGI can have marriage taxes of
different magnitudes and even oppásite signs; the outcome depends
upon the relative incomes of the spouses, inter qua. Hence, a low
marriage tax on average does not necessarily imply that the system
is even approximately marriage neutral. It can just as well mean
that some families have very high marriage taxes while others have
very high marriage subsidies.
To investigate this possibility, we divided the sample into
couples who pay a positive marriage tax and those who receive a
marriage subsidy, and calculated the average tax/subsidy for each
group. Column (2) of Table 3 shows the proportion of couples in
each AGI group who pay a positive marriage tax, and 'column (3)
shows the average tax paid by members of that group. Similarly,12
column(4)shows the proportion who receive a marriage subsidy in
each AGI group, and column (5) the average subsidy received. (In
any given AGI group, the percentages in columns (2) and (4) may not
add to 100 percent because the tax liabilities of some couples are
approximately unchanged by marriage.)
The results in column (2) suggest that relatively few people
in the very lowest income bracket are penalized by marriage. The
proportion increases almost monotonically with AGI, becoming quite
substantial at the high end. In the $100,000—$200,000 range, for
example, 70 percent of the couples incur a tax for being married.
Moreover, the column (3) results suggest that the size of this tax
can be quite substantial.The average value in the $100,000-
$200,000 range is $2,634, and above that it is $9,980. The figures
near the bottom of columns (2) and (3) indicate that 52 percent of
all couples will pay a positive marriage tax under 08RA93, and its
average will be about $1,244.Relative to the old law, the
percentage of the population paying a marriage tax is just about
the same, but the magnitude of the tax is about $350 higher under
the new law.
The figures in columns (4) and (5) indicate that under OBRA93,
about 38 percent of the couples will receive a marriage subsidy,
and the average value of this subsidy will be about $1,399. Under
the old law, the conditional subsidy was about $1,577.
A thought suggested by our discussion so far is that under
both the old and new laws the dispersion of the marriage tax is
substantial. To get a handle on this issue, we computed the13
standard deviation of the marriage tax for all returns within each
AGI bracket. The results are reported in column (6) of Table 3.
The first thing to note about these numbers is that they are large
relative to the size of the average marriage tax. For example, for
the sample as a whole, the standard deviation of $1,579 is more
than 10 times the average value of $124.Second, OBRA93 has
decreased the dispersion of the marriage tax somewhat ——the
standard deviation under the previous law was $1978.
One possible problem with these results arises from the nature
of the sample, which consists of only joint returns. Such a sample
allows us to learn about the tax consequences of a divorce for
already married couples, but the tax consequences of marriage for
unmarried persons are missing from the picture.Attempts to
simulate the tax consequences of marriage for the unmarried come up
against the difficulty of choosing a potential mate for each single
person. As far as we know, no representative.dataset includes
information on this subject. However, we found one database that
may allow us to glean at least some insights, the National.
Longitudinal Survey Mother-Child database. For each individual in
the sample, the survey reports whether she has a spouse or a
"partner". The universe is mothers aged 25 to 33 in 1990, but the
income information is for 1989. The income information is much
less rich than in TAXSIM ——allthat is available is wages
(including military pay) and self-employment income. There are no
data on dividends and interest, but we would not expect capital to
be an important component of income for this sample.14
Our goal is to compare the consequences of marriage on the
joint tax liabilities of cohabiting couples with the tax
consequences of divorce for married couples. To make the results
as comparable as possible to those in Table 3, we "aged" the data
to 1994 levels, and applied the 1994 tax law.'0 The results are
reported in Table 4. The first three lines of the table provide
some summaryinformationabout the married and cohabiting samples.
There are many more married than cohabiting couples in the data,
and the married couples have substantially higher joint incomes ——
$49,840versus $31,422. The mean marriage tax for the married
couples is $556; the mean tax that the cohabiting couples would
face if they married is $229. However, the differences are not
statistically significant.
The percentage of the cohabiting couples who would face a
marriage tax (38 percent) is low relative to that of married
couples (62 percent). The difference is not attributable to the
fact that the cohabiting couples are more likely to face marriage
subsidies; 34 percent of the married face a subsidy versus 37
percent for the cohabitors. Rather, the difference arises because
so many of the cohabitors face no marriage tax at all. This is due
to the fact that many are on welfare, and have zero AGIs.
Interestingly, conditional on facing a marriage tax or subsidy, the
magnitudes are roughly similar for the two groups ——the
conditional mean marriage taxes differ by only $133, and the
conditional mean subsidies by $284. Taking this fact together with
the observation that the incidence of cohabiting couples is15
relatively quite small in the population, we tentatively conclude
that ignoring cohabiting couples does not substantially bias our
results.But clearly this is an issue that warrants further
research.
4. Conclusion
The changes in the rate schedules and earned income tax credit
embodied in the new tax law have implications for the tax
consequences of marriage. On average, the income tax now imposes
a mild tax on marriage of $124, while under the previous law there
was a small subsidy of $143. However, the small average figure
conceals the fact that some families will be paying substantial
taxes or receiving substantial subsidies for being married.In
1994, about 52 percent of U.S. families will pay an average
marriage tax of $1,244. This corresponds to a total of about $33
billion. At the same time, about 38 percent of the families will
receive a marriage subsidy averaging $1,399 per family; the
aggregate amount will be about $27 billion.
Our results lead naturally to the question of whether the new
marriage tax will affect people's behavior." As we showed
earlier, at least for some low income couples, the size of the
marriage tax is now quite extraordinary, amounting to over 18
percent of total income. An interesting topic for future research
will be to see if the incidence of joint filing diminishes in this
group. In this context, it is important to note that a reduction
in joint filing is not the same thing as a reduction in marriage.
It is costly and difficult for the Internal Revenue Service to16
learn about taxpayers' family situations. One possible response to
huge marriage taxes may be that taxpayers will simply not reveal to
the I.R.S. that they are married.17
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END NOTE 8
1.This poem is from a collection entitled Son of an Oyster,
Orchises Press: Alexandria, Virgnina, 1989.
2. January 11, 1994, p. A5.
3.Actual marginal tax rates may be higher due to the personal
exemption and itemized deduction phaseouts, and due to the 1.45
percent payroll tax for health insurance. See Young (1993].
4.For further analysis of the EITC, see Scholz (1993) and
Browning [1993). OBRA93 substantially increased the EITC. Under
previous law, for example, the maximum credit for a family with two
children would have been only $2,015, as opposed to the $2,528 in
the table.
5. By the "old law" we mean the 1992 law as it would have looked
in 1994 after the bracket widths, standard deductions and personal
exemptions were indexed for inflation in the intervening years.
6.More extreme cases can be illustrated, but they probably
correspond to unlikely family situations. For example, consider
two individuals each of whom has two children and each of whom
earns $13,616. The marriage tax in this case is $5,875, about 21
percent of pre—tax income.
7.For these very high income couples, the marriage tax is
independent of the number of children because all the personal
exemptions are phased out.
8.Feenberg and Coutts [1993] provide a detailed discussion of
TAXSIM.
9. The totals in the table include those few returns with negative
AGI, but these are not presented in the table.
10.In the absence of information on itemized deductions, we
assume that all returns used a standard deduction.
11. As is the case with any tax, to the extent the marriage tax
distorts behavior, it induces a welfare loss that exceeds revenues
collected.19
TABLE 1
TAZ PARAMETERS bR 1994
Rate Schedules
Taxable Income
Marginal Joint SeDarate Sinale Head of Household
Tax Rate
15% $0 —38,000 $0 —19,000 $0 —22,750 $0 —30,500
28% 38,000—91,850 19,000—45,925 22,750—55,100 30,500—78,700
31% 91,850—140,000 45,925—70,000 55,100—115,00078,700—127,500
36% 140,000—250,000 70,000—125,000 115,000—250,000 127,500—250,000







NoChildren 7.65 $0—4,000 $306 .$5,000—9,000
OneChild 26.3 $0—7,750 $2,038 $11,000—23,755
Two or More
Children
30.0 $0—8,525 $2,528 $11,000—25,299
Standard Deduction
Joint Set,arate Sinale Head of Household
$6,350 $3,175 $3,800 $5,600
Source:Young (1993, pp. 111, 113).The personal exemption is $2,450




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TEEMARRIAGETAX BY )ICOXE CLASS(2.994)
(Figures in brackets are for the pre—1993 law.]
Lu Lu Lu (4 Lu Lu
Averaae%Tax>0Averace %Tax<0Averace S.D. of
Class Tax Pos Tax Ne Tax Tax
<510K —$59 15% 278 23% —$440 $593
(32] (18) (158) (20) (—309)(521)
10—20K 46 53 409 36 —467 578
(33] (54] (371) (36] (—471) (529)
20—30K 217 57 807 40 —599 953
(—18) (53] (438) (43] (—581) (641]
30—40K 149 61 699 35 —799 913
(2) (59] (479) (36] (—773)(747]
40—50K —225 49 587 43 —1183 1128
(—240](47) (556) (44) (—1134) (1093.]
50—75K —366 47 1012 47 —1806 1800
(—388) (47) (999] (46] (—1750](1757)
75—lOOK 73 65 1570 35 —2745 2537
(47] (65) (1519](35) (—2707)(2486]
100— 657 70 2634 29 —4073 3928
200K (503] (71) (2236] (29) (—3829)(3444]
>200K 7451 86 9980 12 —9157 10815
(—3667](66] (3827)(34] (18241) (38694)
Mean $124 52% $1244 38% —$1399$1579"
(—143](51) (898) (38] (—1577](1978)
Total $6.4b — $33.b — —$27b
(—7.4b] (23.b] (—31b)
*Calculatjongare based on the TAXISM model and are explained in the text.
Column (1) shows th. average marriage tax over all couples. Column (2) shows
the percentage ofcouples that incur a positive marriage tax, and column (3)
showsthe average tax, conditional on being positive. Similarly, column (4)
shows the percentage of couples that receive a subsidy, and column (5) shows
the average subsidy. Column (6) shows th. standard deviation of the marriage
tax within the income class.
"Standard deviation for the sample as a whole, the average of the
standard deviations for each income group.TABLE 4
MARRIAGETAXIN TEE NLBY MOTHER-CHILD DATA
Married Cohabitina
Number ofObservations 1448 139




Mean Marriage Tax $556 $229
(1,319) (858)
Subsample with Positive Marriage Tax
Percent of Population 62% 38%
Mean Marriage Tax in Subsample $1,413 $1,280
(904) (716)
Subsamplewith Negative Marriage Tax
Percent of Population 34% 37%
Mean Marriage Tax in Subsample —$992 —$708
(426) (148)
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.
22